As a security primitive, key establishment plays the most crucial role in the designing of the security mechanism in the wireless sensor networks (WSNs) 
Introduction
A wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is a collection of a large number sensor nodes that has limited computation, communication and power resources distributed in a designed area without any fixed structure [1] [2] . Each sensor node is a small device that consists of data processing, sensing, and short range radio communication units, and a battery. Typically, sensor nodes are employed to collect environmental information. This information is aggregated by transferring it to other sensor nodes wirelessly until it reaches a sink node. Wireless sensor networks are candidates for many applications such as border security, military target tracking and scientific research in dangerous environment [3] [4] [5] . Since sensor nodes are often deployed in hostile locations, particularly with military applications, security is an essential issue in these networks. For instance, an adversary could capture sensor nodes, intercept transmitted messages, and propagate fake messages to the networks. Some researchers have studied the security issues of WSNs [6, 7] . Key management plays an important role on security in wireless sensor networks [8] . However, key management is WSNs is a difficult problem because of resource constraints of the sensor nodes.
In the literature, key management protocols are based on either symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic functions. Due to resource limitations in the sensor nodes, key management protocols based on public key cryptographic (asymmetric functions) are not appropriate [5] .A particular symmetric approach in WSNs is to use key predistribution with the sensor nodes, resulting in low cost key establishment. In this regard, various schemes have been proposed for key management in WSNs [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . The choice of a key management protocol should consider factors such as processing overhead, resource consumption and connectivity. However, some of these goals are contradictory [13, 18] . For example, increasing network connectivity also increases the memory requirements of sensor nodes. Hence, some techniques that provide high connectivity also consume significant memory and processing power. Others use less memory but have low connectivity.
In this paper, a new key management for WSNs is proposed using double keyed-hash chains. In this protocol, the upward key pool and downward key pool are generated and each sensor node is given two key rings: upward key ring and downward key ring. Upward keys provide upward secrecy since the adversary cannot learn upward keys in the lower class sensor nodes even if it compromise higher class sensor nodes. Similarly, downward keys provide downward secrecy since the adversary cannot learn downward keys in the higher class sensor nodes even if it compromise lower class sensor nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related works. Section 3 presents the development of our scheme. Section 4 describes the performances of our scheme, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Selected Related Work
Eschenauer et al., [9] proposed the first random key pre-distribution scheme for WSNs, which we call EG scheme in this paper. In this scheme, during key predistribution scheme, a large key pool is initialized and some keys from a large keypool are selected randomly and stored in the sensor nodes. After deployment, sensor may find a common key which can be used to establish secure communication. If not, the common key is established via an intermediate sensor node which has common keys with both of the sensor nodes. In this scheme, the capture of a node may lead to compromising a link between two no captured nodes, since these two nodes may have used the same key to secure their communication. To reduce the fraction of compromised links between noncompromsied nodes, a modification to the random key scheme, denominated q-compromised scheme, is presented [10] . In this solution, for two nodes to establish a secure communication link, they are required to share at least q (q>1) common keys in their key rings. The secret common key is the hash of the q common keys in their key rings.
Liu et al., proposed a new key predistribution scheme [11] , which substantially improved the resilience of the network compared to the existing schemes. In this scheme, every sensor node is preloaded with coefficient of symmetric bivariate polynomial computed at one of its variables using its identification. The symmetry property of the polynomial allows two nodes to get their pairwise key respectively. This scheme exhibits a nice threshold property, which means that when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that communications between any additional nodes are compromised is close to zero. A similar method was also developed by Du et al., [12] , in which matrices are uses instead of polynomials. These two schemes are explored in [13] [14] [15] .
Du et al., [16] developed a scheme using pre-deployment knowledge. In this scheme, they assume that the sensor nodes are deployed in groups of some sensor nodes over a rectangular area. In the key predistribution phase, the original key pool is divides into many smaller pools, each of which is associated to different group. These schemes can gain substantial improvement over exiting schemes that do not exploit deployment. This group-based deployment model is further deployed in [17, 18] .
The upward sub-key pool:
The upward sub-key pool is initiated with M/2 keys which are generated with a key generator. Each key of the rest classes is generated by hashing the first class key with a secure hash function. More precisely, the j-th class keys in the forward key pool are defined as follows:
uk is the fist class of the i-th upward hash key chain and randomly generated by a key generator.
The downward sub-key pool:
The downward sub-key pool is initiated with M/2 the highest class keys which are generated with a key generator. Each key of the rest classes is generated by hashing the highest class key with a secure hash function. More precisely, the j-th class keys in the forward key pool are defined as follows:
dk is the (L-1)-th class of the i-th downward hash key chain and randomly generated by a key generator.
After the two key pools have been generated, the upward and downward key rings are assigned to each sensor. To do this, the sensor nodes are divided into L classes in the network and the j-th class sensor nodes are configured with j class upward keys 
Pairwise Key Establishment Phase
In the network bootstrap phase, each sensor node is required to broadcast its class and key ring to the neighbor nodes. Hence, each node will know which keys its neighbors have and which classes its neighbors are. 
Sensor node v:
Performance Analysis
In this section, the proposed scheme is analyzed, including network connectivity, resilience against node capture and performance overhead.
Local Connectivity
Local connectivity is defined as the probability that two neighboring nodes can establish can establish communication pairwise keys directly. Suppose there are two sensor node u and v in the WSNs. Let A(u, v) be the event that node u and v have at Figure 2 shows the network local connectivity of the proposed scheme for different .It is also nodded that for larger key ring size m the local connectivity also increase. From figure 1 and equation (5), we can also find the local connectivity has no relation with the class L.
Resilience against Node Capture
In this section, we evaluate how the proposed scheme improves the network security in terms of resilience against node capture. We compare our scheme with some existing schemes by calculating the fraction of compromised communication among noncompromised nodes.
Fraction of Compromised Network Communication:
Now we study the resiliency property of the proposed scheme against node compromise by calculating the fraction of communication keys in the network that are compromised due to key revealing resulted from captured nodes. Here, we calculate the probability the compromising the shared pairwise key between these two non-compromised sensor nodes when there are x sensor nodes have been captured. In the proposed scheme, the adversary can't get a lower class key from a higher class key which is in the same upward key chain and can't get a higher class key from lower class key which is in the same downward key chain.
Suppose K be the communication key used by two noncompromsied sensor nodes. Let B i represent the joint event that K derived from the i-th key pair A i <uk w , dk v >, 0<i≤M 2 /4，and uk w and ud v are both compromised. We use the notation K∈A i to represent that "key K was derived using key pair A i ". Let C x be the event that x nodes has been compromised. When x nodes have been compromised, the probability of the communication key K been compromised is:
As events 
Note that ) (
Since the event (K∈A 1 ) is independent of the event C x and (A 1 is compromised), therefore 
.Suppose sensor node u and v are two uncompromised sensor nodes. And the level of sensor node u is l u and the sensor node v is l v . Without loss of generality, here we assume l v ≤l u . Assume sensor node c has been compromised, which class is l c . As there are L classes, the probability that the class of the sensor node c is less than or equal to sensor node v is (l v +1)/L, and the probability that the class of the sensor node c is greater than or equal to sensor node u is (L-l u )/L. So the probability of the any one compromised sensor node can get the upward key in any two uncompromised sensor nodes can be defined as follow
And the probability of the any one compromised sensor node can get the downward key in any two uncompromised sensor nodes can be defined as follow
So if the adversary has compromised x sensor nodes, he can get the upward keys from the xP u compromised sensor nodes and get the downward keys from the xP d compromised sensor nodes. Then we have (14) From formula (11) and (14), we have 
Comparison with Related Work:
Here, we compare our scheme with EG scheme [9] , and q-composite scheme (for q=2, 3) [10] . To access how much is the improvements gained by the proposed scheme, we compare the security performance of several schemes for different parameter situations and use the same amount of the storage per node for a fair comparison. In the comparison, we assume that each node can store 200 keys and the local connectivity P local is 0.34 and 0.5 respectively. Figure4 (a)(b) clearly shows that our scheme has better security performances than that of EG schemes and q-composite scheme. Taken as an example, the case in which P local =0.34, when an adversary compromise 400 sensor nodes compromised, about be 55% of links compromised between non-compromised sensors in EG scheme will be disclosed, 79% in q-composite (q=2), 93% in q-composite (q=3) while there will only be 20% in our scheme. The reason is that in EG scheme and q-composite scheme compromised sensor nodes will disclose all the keys in them while in the our scheme only part of keys will be disclosed in the compromised sensor nodes. 
Memory Usage and Communication Overhead
Memory usage: Memory in sensors is often very restricted, so the key establishment protocol should use memory efficiently. According to our scheme, during the initialization phase each sensor node needs to store m keys over finite field q F . In addition, each node needs to remain the Id of the keys and the class of sensor nodes. Assume the Id of sensor nodes are chosen from a finite field ' F q and the class of sensor nodes are chosen from a finite field ' ' F q Thus, the overall storage overhead are ' ' ' log ) log (logm + + bits. However, in EG scheme [9] and q-composite scheme [10] the sensor nodes are need not to identity of its class, so there are more ' ' F q bits memory storage needed in the proposed scheme.
Communication Overhead: In the shared key discover phase each sensor node need to disclose of a list of m index of keys and the class of itself to its neighbor nodes. Similar to the memory overhead analysis, there are more than ' ' log q communication overhead needed than that of the EG scheme and q-composite scheme.
For example, if there are eight classes of sensor nodes in the system, there are will be only more 3 bits memory usage and communication overhead in the proposed scheme than in the EG scheme and composite scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, a new key management scheme based on EG scheme was proposed. The proposed approach uses double one-way hash functions to generate many sub key pools. With the one-way hash function, the proposed scheme can make attackers get less key information from the compromised sensor nodes. The effectiveness of the proposed scheme has been demonstrated through analysis and comparison with other scheme.
